



10 | Automne 2017 / Hiver 2018
États-Unis / Cuba : une nouvelle donne ?
The Long Itinerary to Normalization: The Cuban –
Latin American Relations
Le long parcours vers la normalisation : les relations entre Cuba et l’Amérique
latine










Dirk Kruijt, « The Long Itinerary to Normalization: The Cuban – Latin American Relations », IdeAs
[Online], 10 | Automne 2017 / Hiver 2018, Online since 29 November 2017, connection on 23 April
2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ideas/2162  ; DOI : 10.4000/ideas.2162 
This text was automatically generated on 23 April 2019.
IdeAs – Idées d’Amériques est mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence Creative Commons
Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.
The Long Itinerary to
Normalization: The Cuban – Latin
American Relations
Le long parcours vers la normalisation : les relations entre Cuba et l’Amérique
latine




1 In Cuba, since 1902 an American protectorate, a regime change took place (1959) that
produced enormous consequences for Latin America and the Caribbean. This happened at
a key moment in the Cold War. The two world powers during the next three decades tried
to establish friendly relations and defense alliances with countries in Asia, Africa and
Latin  America.  In  the  case  of  being  confronted  with  countries  adverse  to  their
partnerships, they tried to influence the internal political structure or, if this resulted to
be unsuccessful, to set off coups or participate in proxy warfare.
2 This article tries and traces these consequences in the context of Cuba’s foreign relations
with the Latin American and Caribbean region. My guiding research question is how Cuba
coped with its singular position of enmity with the USA and Soviet friendship during the
Cold War without losing its own long-term objective: not only survive but also produce
radical changes in the Latin American and Caribbean region, Africa and Asia? And how
did Cuba continue influencing its Caribbean and Latin American neighbours when the
military muscle and the generous economic assistance of the Soviet Union ended? 
3 In the course of this contribution it will become clear that Cuba, as a guiding principle,
always sought and acquired political support from the non-aligned (NO AL) countries and
became an eminent member state of this organization. And that it always accompanied its
military endeavours with humanitarian aid as long as it had one of the largest standing
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armies in the region. After the Cold War it continued its humanitarian assistance and
maintained a position of influence far beyond its ‘country class’ of an island with eleven
million inhabitants. 
4 In  this  part  I  distinguish  three  phases:  the  period  of  revolutionary  fervour,  largely
coinciding with the period of  the 1960s.  In that period Cuba was quickly affected by
American  hostility  and  aggression  and  sought  political  and  economic  support  and
stability from the Soviet Union. But it followed its own trajectory with respect to support
to liberation movements and guerrilla warfare.  The second period coincides with the
1980s and most of the 1990s, when Cuba’s political system was gradually more moulded
after the Soviet Union and the economic and financial support of the COMECON countries
was  generous.  But  it  continued  to  follow  the  course  the  leadership  thought  was
appropriate:  warfare  in  colonial  conflicts  in  Africa,  advice  and  support  to  guerrilla
movements in the region while intensifying medical assistance. 
5 The last phase is the post-1990 period of economic survival, restructuring of the economy
and bit-by-bit political reforms, still expanding its medical and literacy campaigns and
finding an economic and political good friend in the person of Venezuela’s president
Hugo Chávez. Cuba’s post-Cold War humanitarian internationalism provided it with the
sympathy, gratitude or at least appreciation of many, if not most Latin American and
Caribbean governments. It also coincided with Latin America’s Pink Tide governments
(pro-poor and reform minded governments) that emerged in important countries of the
region at the turn of the century. When Fidel Castro was succeeded by his brother Raúl
(2006)  a  more  pragmatic  external  policy  and  a  cautious  internal  economic  reform
program was implemented. The icy relations with the Catholic episcopate in Cuba slowly
melted and that paved the way to a rapport with the United States during the Obama
administration.  This  article  is  especially  concerned  with  the  Cuban-Latin  American
relationship and the role of the countries in the region in the long period of diplomatic
defrosting. 
6 Much of the argumentation is based on new information, basically obtained from original
fieldwork between 2010 and 2013, and more specifically on numerous interviews with key
actors from the Cuban leadership. The interviews refer to two categories of persons: the
veterans of the insurgency of Fidel and Raúl Castro and Che Guevara, and the (retired)
officers of the Departamento América, after 1975 resorting under the Central Committee
of the Party and before operating in the corridors of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT)
where it was part of Cuba’s intelligence structure. The Departamento America and its
predecessors functioned as the ‘eyes and ears of Fidel Castro’ and were the direct liaison
with the Latin American insurgency.
 
The decade of the 1960s
7 The  Cuban  Revolution  began  as  a  revolt  against  a  hated  dictator,  supported  by  the
American government. Urban insurgency movements and a rural guerrilla succeeded in
surviving  a  repressive  political  police  apparatus  and to  wage  war  against  a  massive
counterinsurgency  deployment.  Eventually  Batista’s  army imploded and the  guerrilla
movement prevailed. 
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8 After the victory in January 1959, a significant number of combatants thought that they
had fulfilled their patriotic duty and went back to home to resume their daily lives. It
took more than two years before the new government declared Cuba a socialist country. 
9 In the course of these two years,  Cuba had become heavily involved in a power play
between the two superpowers,  the United States and the Soviet Union.  The USA had
followed  the  progression  of  the  Cuban  reforms  and  its  radicalization  process  with
growing uneasiness. It interpreted its internal trajectory as a march towards communism.
Already in December 1959 the Eisenhower administration approved an action plan to
overthrow Castro. Soviet Vice-Premier Mikoyan visited Cuba in February 1960 and three
months later diplomatic relations with Moscow were instituted. The Soviet Union also
started to provide economic and military support. 
10 Meanwhile,  in 1960 and 1961 assaults on Cuban civilian targets took place:  economic
sabotage, bombings, assassination attempts and even killings by actors operating from
the USA. In the course of action, some covert operators and CIA agents were arrested
(Solomon  D.,  2011;  Escalante  Font  F.,  2010). In  April  1961,  a  battle  group  of  1,400
paramilitary mercenaries, trained in Guatemala and Nicaragua, invaded Cuba. But Fidel
Castro had mobilized the army and the newly created militias. After two days of severe
fighting the invaders surrendered with the loss of 114 dead and 1,200 captured. Exactly
one day before, Castro, addressing a speech to an audience of a million people, declared
the country a socialist one under enormous applause. 
11 In May 1962 Khrushchev became Cuba’s self-appointed military protector by soliciting
Fidel Castro’s permission to deploy nuclear missiles on the island. When the Kennedy
administration was informed about their presence and launching capacity, the president
ordered a naval blockade. Under the threat of a nuclear war, the Soviet and the American
governments cut a secret deal. The Cuban leadership was informed by the international
press and felt humiliated (Ramonet I., 2008:312). The Soviet Union overcame the situation
with increasing grants and military assistance. In 1972 Cuba became a full member of
COMECON although it never became a member of the Warsaw Pact.
12 The  blockade  imposed  by  the  USA  was  to  become  eternalized  in  a  fifty-year  long
economic  embargo2. It  was  also accompanied  by  a  diplomatic  quarantine.  Cuba’s
membership of the Organization of American States (OAS) was suspended in 1962, under
strong pressure  from the United States.  All  Latin American countries  ruptured their
diplomatic relations with Cuba, with the exception of Mexico3. In the 1960s, Cuba trained
and supported guerrilla movements in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela4.  The
main coordinating instrument was the Departamento América,  the specialized liaison
structure with the guerrilla movements whose previous organizational structures were
incorporated in the intelligence and Special Forces structures5.
13 Che Guevara’s campaign in Bolivia ended with his capture and murder6. But everywhere
in  the  Caribbean  and  in  Latin  America,  regular  armies,  police  detachments  and
paramilitary  units  succeeded  in  defeating  or  at  least  isolating  all  existing  guerrilla
movements in these years, generally after barbaric counterinsurgency campaigns. While
Guevara had promoted “one, two, three Vietnams”, the United States and the military
dictatorships in the region had successfully prevented two or three other Cuba’s.
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The changing context in the 1970s and 1980s
14 In the 1970s Cuba initiated a new approach of  more flexibility and pragmatism with
respect to Latin America and the Soviet Union. Cuba’s economic development stagnated
and its survival increasingly depended on external supplies and East European subsidies.
Realignment with Moscow, accompanied by “ideological realism”, was thus unavoidable
(Blight J. & Brenner P., 2002). The Cuban leadership imported a substantial number of
Soviet experts. The number of Soviet specialists increased from 1,000 in the early 1960s to
6,000 by 1975; 50% were military specialists (Duncan W.R., 1985:87ff,101). Soviet financing
had made Cuba heavily dependent on continuous COMECON imports and subsidies. 
15 By and large, the 1970s and the 1980s were years of Cuba’s relative prosperity. Housing,
medical previsions, schools and universities, electricity, domestic telephone provision,
sports and cultural facilities, radio, TV, and even clothing were provided by the state. A
professional could earn 500 pesos (rubles) per month; a secretary went home with 150
pesos. Prices were controlled. Transport was becoming a problem, but one could win a
Lada car by merit7. Unemployment was below 4%. Cuba’s annual growth between 1975
and 1985 was more than 4%, more favorable than that of the economies of the rest of
Latin America and the Caribbean, with average growth rates around 1%8.
16 There are indications that the Soviet Union advised on the closure of the sections of
assistance  to  the  Middle  East  and  Africa,  and  the  eventual  transference  of  the
Departamento  América  to  the  ‘civilian’  Committee  of  International  Department  of
International  Relations of  the Central  Committee9.  But  whatever influence the Soviet
Union had,  Castro  maintained  a  relatively  independent  course  with  respect  to  Latin
America and the Caribbean. As Soviet intelligence officials observed as well, Castro was
never an obedient disciple of Soviet politics (Pavlov Y., 1994:97ff)
17 Cuba had had a formidable army that sometimes combined regular and irregular warfare
like the Vietnamese.  During the three decades of ‘fraternal cooperation’  between the
Soviet Union and Cuba, on an annual basis the army was provided with supplies, training
and equipment worth about 1 billion dollars. At the peak of expansion, by the end of the
1970s and during its Africa campaigns, the armed forces had between 470,000 and 510,000
members. A notable analyst, Latell, CIA officer at the Cuba desk in 1964 and the National
Intelligence Officer for Latin America in the 1990s, observes:
It was the largest military force in Latin America and vastly bigger than those of
countries Cuba’s size anywhere in the world. Furthermore, man for man during the
1970s and 1980s, it may have been the best and most experienced fighting force of
any small nation, with the single exception of Israel (Latell B., 2003:10-11).
18 In Latin America, the 1970s and 1980s were the period of the Dependency Theory at the
universities and the Liberation Theology in the churches. The student generations and
the  radicalizing  Catholics  were  appealed  by  the  anti-imperialist  arguments of  the
dependency theorists. Liberation Theology was even more influential in the hearts and
minds of large segments of the Latin American population. The influence of the new
theology  on  center-left  and  far-left  groups  of  the  existing  and  new  revolutionary
movements  is  conclusive.  In  Central  America  Liberation  Theology  was  of  enormous
influence. Half of the circa forty Nicaraguan comandantes were recruited by radicalized
priests. Thousands of Church Base Communities supported the guerrilla organizations in
El  Salvador.  In  Guatemala  Jesuit  and  Maryknoll  priests  were  organizing  Mayan
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communities. Many young guerrilla leaders were recruited from the Central American
student movement (Kruijt D., 2008:44-47). Murdered Che Guevara and fallen Colombian
ELN priest Camilo Torres were both revolutionary and moral icons. Archbishop Romero
was assassinated in 1980 while celebrating mass; he and several other killed Jesuit priests
San  Salvador  were  also  incorporated  into  the  rows  of  Latin  American  revolutionary
heroes and martyrs.
19 In  this  context  of  Dependency  Theory  and  Liberation  Theology,  Cuba  reoriented  its
appreciation of new actors and organizations in Latin America. The Instituto Cubano de
Amistad  con  los  Pueblos (ICAP)  identified  other  actors  and  movements  beyond  the
traditional  “revolutionaries”.  It  was  time  to  pay  attention  to  the  nationalist-leftists
regimes and movements: 
We realized that by being more open-minded and using a more delicate tone, we
penetrated sectors to which we otherwise would never have gotten access. That is
what  we called  “popular  diplomacy”,  going  beyond the  sectors  we traditionally
reached, the so-called “revolutionary sectors” 10.
20 The ICAP also created ‘visiting brigades’:  American visitors and students came to the
island with the Brigada Venceremos, and Europeans with the Brigada Europa. Later, the
Brigada  Latinoamericana  was  founded.  Notwithstanding  the  official  Cuban  ‘scientific
atheism’, the ICAP and the Departamento América tried to invite the representatives of
the new theologians to the island:
During a long period we maintained good relations with many of the progressive
religious believers of the continent. A large number came to Cuba and it facilitated
the ideological and political insight of Cubans into that even so important issue. On
matters  of  religion  many  Latin  Americans  and  some  Europeans,  like  François
Houtart,  assisted  us.  I  conversed  and  dined  twice  with  Gustavo  Gutiérrez,  the
founder of Liberation Theology, and transmitted him Fidel’s invitation to come to
Cuba. But he didn’t dare to make that trip 
21 remembers  Martínez  Heredia,  Cuba’s  leading  philosopher  until  his  death  in  201711. 
Famous Dominican Frei Betto (1985) came to Havana and interviewed Fidel Castro about
religion and revolution. In the early 1990s, the ICAP co-organized solidarity flights from
Brazil (with theologists Frei Betto and Leonardo Boff who celebrated mass), accompanied
by entrepreneurs, politicians, students and artists. ICAP also assisted in masses celebrated
by progressive priests with solidarity groups from Argentina and Colombia12.
22 In  general,  Cuba  actively  supported  guerrilla  movements  that  opposed  military
dictatorships. 
23 Previously, in the 1960s Cuba separately trained all individual guerrilla movements, even
when they were competitors in the same country, like in Argentina, Central America,
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. The code of conduct of the Departamento América was to
be strict neutrality in ideological arguments. But now it explicitly tried to create politico-
military umbrella organizations: in Argentina where its diplomats attempted to mediate
between the Montoneros and the Trotskyist-Guevarist ERP; in post-Allende Chile doing
their utmost to unify the MIR and the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR); and
assisting the Colombian Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (CGSB, 1987-1990).The
unification of three diverging Sandinista guerrilla segments in Nicaragua was built at the
Cuban embassy in Panama (1978/7913. The gradual unity between the five guerrilla groups
in El Salvador was shaped at Cuba’s Mexican embassy (1980/82). After large discussions,
the  four  antagonistic  Guatemalan  guerrilla  movements  integrated  into  the  Unidad
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG, 1982), also in Mexico City.
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The end of the diplomatic quarantine and Cuba’s new
pragmatism
24 In the 1970s, many of Cuba’s political alliances with leftist movements and its leaders
were based on personal  friendships  with Fidel:  in  the Caribbean with the leaders  of
Jamaica, Granada, Guayana, and Surinam. Castro also became close with Chile’s president
Allende, Panama’s leader General Torrijos and the political team of Peruvian president
General Velasco14. He also chose Cuban diplomats who would probably be appreciated by
these leaders and would become ‘friends of the president’, even before the establishment
of formal bilateral relations. Cuba managed to resume diplomatic relations with various
Latin  American  countries:  Chile  (November  1970),  Peru  (July  1972),  Ecuador  (August
1972),  Panama  (August  1974)  and  Argentina  (May  1973)  after  the  return  of  Perón.
Venezuela reinstated its embassy in Havana in December 1974 and Colombia in March
1975. In 1977, Costa Rica resumed bilateral consular relations. Some countries suspended
their bilateral relations temporarily: Colombia (1981) and Costa Rica (1981). In the 1990s
and 2000s,  all  Latin American countries  had established or  renewed their  diplomatic
relations. 
25 Cuba certainly has a special affinity with the Caribbean island states (Hernández R., 2011;
Cecena A. E. et al, 2011). There is certainly a kind of ‘Caribbeanism’ that makes personal
relations  easy,  despite  linguistic and  cultural  differences15.  The  English  speaking
independent  or  recently  independent  states  were  (and  are)  sympathetic  to  Cuba.
Barbados,  Guyana,  Jamaica  and  Trinidad  and  Tobago  took  the  collective  decision  to
inaugurate  diplomatic  relations  with  the  country  in  December  1972.  The  Bahamas
followed in 1974, Granada in April 1979, (Dutch speaking) Surinam in May 1979, and Santa
Lucia in August 1979. In the 1990s, San Vicente and Nevis,  Antigua and Barbuda, San
Cristobal  and  Nevis,  and  Dominica  did  the  same.  Relations  with  the  Association  of
Caribbean States (ACS), in which islands and territories with American, English, French
and Dutch statehood also participate, were fluid. During its decades-long dictatorship, the
two countries of the former Hispaniola had suspended (Haiti) or ruptured (Dominican
Republic) their diplomatic relations; they normalized their relations in 1966 (Haiti) and
1998 (Dominican Republic) 16.
26 Once diplomatic relations were established, Cuba retracted direct support to the Armed
Left. The most significant country was Mexico, Cuba’s diplomatic life line. Diplomats and
visiting officials of the Departamento América had to explain to insurgent groups that
Cuba could not  be  of  assistance.  When diplomatic  relations  with Colombia had been
resumed,  the  new Cuban ambassador  in  Bogotá  had the delicate  task  to  inform the
Colombian president that Fabio Vásquez, leader of the ELN, was living in Havana and was
receiving  medical  treatment  there.  Then  he  had  to  explain  to  the  (guevarista)  ELN
leadership,  that  “Cuba,  given the  new circumstances,  could  not  continue  supporting
[them] like in the previous years” 17.  After  the fall  of  Allende,  the Chilean Christian
Democrats, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party had formed an alliance, after
discussions  in  Cuba.  Meanwhile,  the  Frente  Patriótico  Manuel  Rodríguez  (FPMR)  was
created in Cuba at Fidel Castro’s suggestion with direct assistance of the Departamento
América, as the armed branch of the Communist Party. When the FPMR severed its ties
with the PC Cuba made a judgement of Salomon and attended both the PC and the FPMR.
But the Departamento América told the FPMR leadership about Castro’s promise to the
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Christian Democrats that, after Pinochet’s eventual demise, Cuba’s relationship with the
Chilean left would only be ‘humanitarian’. Indeed, the Departamento América maintained
good relations with the FPMR and the PC, but in 1990 it broke off all relations18. Cuba’s
pragmatism can best be illustrated by the case of the Argentinean ERP. After the coup in
1976, Argentina maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba and delivered strategic goods
to the island. When Mattini, the last comandante of the ERP, asked the Cuban leadership
for support, it was denied19.
 
Cuba’s Soft Power Diplomacy after 1989
27 Cuba’s military was also hit hard by the downfall of the Socialist Block. In December 1982,
Soviet Party leader Andropov had notified Raúl Castro that the Soviet Union would not
defend Cuba by sending troops. Economic and military support by the Soviets continued
on a diminishing scale after 1985, but fell  dramatically by the end of 1991, when the
Soviet Union morphed into Russia. Delivery of new weapons and spare parts was very
difficult;  the  only  possibility  to  maintain  operational  condition  of  the  military  was
cannibalizing older equipment. Fuel was restricted for emergency situations20. The Armed
Forces were officially halved while the budget was cut in half (Klepak H., 2000:3ff.; 2005:
47ff).  A  similar  process  occurred  with  respect  to  the  military  structures  and  the
intelligence previsions within the Ministry of the Interior. In 1994, the Special Forces of
this ministry, the training specialists of the Latin American guerrilla in former decades,
were dissolved.
28 The Cuban government announced a “Special Period in Peacetime”, to tighten the belt, to
hold out and to proceed while the standard of living shrunk to severe proportions. Cuba’s
economy and society were transfigured into a Spartan system of extreme austerity and
ideological  tightening.  When in the late 1980s the leadership of  the Colombian M-19
visited the island and asked for support,  Fidel  Castro told him frankly that the only
solution was a political one, by means of peace negotiations:
At that moment, Comandante Carlos Pizarro came to Cuba to ask for help. Cuba’s
austerity period, the “Período Especial”, had begun. Fidel told him that he should
pursue a negotiated political solution. In his view, at that moment there were very
few possibilities for a politico-military organisation to come to power by means of
weapons, as had [once] happened in Cuba and Nicaragua21.
29 And when Hugo Chávez in 1994 negotiated with Cuban diplomats about his first trip to
Cuba, they told him that “Cuba not even could buy him a matchbox”. Chavez decided to
buy the ticket himself22.
30 Confronted by its own austerity and reduction of military capability, Cuba did neither
reduce its diplomacy nor its foreign aid. Cuba continued to maintain diplomatic relations
throughout the world. While cutting its training assistance to the insurgency movements
in the region, it intensified its medical assistance to Latin America, the Caribbean and
Africa. And it used its international prestige to act as peace facilitator in Central America
and Colombia where guerrilla and counterinsurgency operations continued in the 1990s
and thereafter. 
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The Soft Power of medical and literacy and assistance
23
31 Cuba’s internationalism, which in previous decades had been predominantly expressed by
support for guerrilla movements in Latin America and the Caribbean and large scale
military  operations  in  Africa,  had  now  turned  into  the  provision  for  humanitarian
assistance in medical and literacy teams24. In fact, Cuba had always been a kind of medical
facility receiving and revalidating wounded and crippled guerrilla militants in the region.
But not only had the Far Left benefited from Cuba’s medical infrastructure. After the
Chernobyl disaster, Castro offered to assist the (then) infant victims and it is still doing it.
Even  political  enemies  were offered  medical  treatment.  Abreu,  during  35  years  the
overviewer of the Departamento América for Central America offered dying ex-major
D’Aubuisson, founder of ARENA, medical treatment in Cuba when he was denied proper
attention in the United States in 1992 (Abreu R., 2013:226-230). The military missions in
Africa had always been accompanied by medical and literacy campaigns, but on a lesser
scale. 
32 Cuba’s  civilian  development  aid  (‘internationalism’)  provided  over  five  decades  poor
citizens in underdeveloped or poor countries with assistance in which Cuba has leading
expertise: public health provisions and literacy campaigns, post-disaster-reconstruction,
and sport (training and facilities). Kirk calculated that 
(…)  in  all,  over  135,000  medical  professionals  from Cuba have  worked [in  Latin
America, the Caribbean, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia]. Between 1960 and 2014,
there  were  some 50,000  of  them (including  25,000  doctors)  working  in  over  60
developing countries. Significantly 69 percent of Cuban doctors have participated
in at least one mission abroad (…) (Kirk J., 2015:3; Feinsilver J., 2010).
33 Cuba assisted in the establishment of medical schools in Yemen (1976), Guyana (1984),
Ethiopia (1984), Guinea Bissau (1986), Uganda (1988), Ghana (1991) Luanda (1992), Gambia
(2000), Equatorial Guinea (2000), Haiti (2001) and Eritrea (2003) 25. The first Cuban medical
mission  abroad  was  in  Algeria  (1963).  Already  by  1978,  around  2,000  Cuban  health
personnel worked abroad; in 1999 there were around 3,000. That number then increased
to 3,800 in 2001, 15,000 in 2003, 25,000 in 2005 and 30,000 in 2007 (Kirk J & Erisman H.M.,
2009:8,12).  During  the  administration  of  Raúl  Castro  (2006-present)  this  number  had
grown and other medical initiatives (medical schooling for foreigners, for example) have
been  continued  or  expanded.  It  brought  and  brings  Cuba  an  enormous  amount  of
prestige, not only in Latin America and the Caribbean, but in the entire Global South
(Huish R., 2014:188ff)
34 In October 1998,  Fidel  Castro launched the idea of a special  Medical  School for Latin
American students, the Escuela Latinoamericana de Ciencias Médicas (ELAM); the new
university opened its doors in September 1999 with students of eighteen Latin American
and Caribbean countries. But in the mid-2000s it started to attract students from other
continents  and,  between 2010  and 2012,  the  annual  number  of  ELAM graduates  was
around  3,000.  In  2012,  students  from  98  countries  (with  31  mother  tongues)  were
matriculated at the ELAM. The ELAM system and the study allowances also expanded to
other  countries  when,  after  the  creation  of  the  ALBA  alliance  between  Cuba  and
Venezuela (see below), Hugo Chávez co-financed and co-developed the Cuban initiative.
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ELAM-like medical schools were established in Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela and an
undergraduate school was set up in Guyana and Nicaragua26.
35 Medical  brigades  operated  or  still  operate  in  many  Latin  American  and  Caribbean
countries, especially after natural disasters27. They continued to work even when, after a
regime  change,  a  new  national  government  was  adverse  to  Cuba.  The  most  recent
example is that of Honduras, where progressive President Zelaya was ousted by a military
coup. The Cuban government decided not to withdrawn their medical personnel and the
new Honduran administration continued to pay their counterpart obligations. In 2004,
Cuba launched the program Operación Milagro (Operation Miracle) to cure cataract and
other eye diseases, co-financed by Venezuela. It started in that country and was extended
to many other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and also in Africa and Asia.
According  to  official  data  2,577,000  persons  benefitted  from  this  Cuban-Venezuelan
initiative  between 2004 and 2015. According to official  data  provided by its  director
Ricardo Riera, nearly four million persons (of which 2’279,259 were Venezuelan patients)
benefitted  from  this  Cuban-Venezuelan  initiative  between  July  2004  and  June  2015
(Telesur, 2016).
36 A second instrument of international assistance is that of literacy campaigns. After tests
in Angola,  Haiti  and Nicaragua,  in 2000 a  literacy program called ‘Yo,  sí  puedo’  was
developed. In the early 2000s it was widely implemented in Venezuela on a massive scale28
. In 2006, within the context of Cuban and Venezuelan support to Bolivia, the program
was adapted in this multinational and multilingual country. Of the indigenous population,
around 40,000 Quechua and Aymara monolingual Bolivians benefitted from the program.
Meanwhile, Cuba had implemented adapted versions of ‘Yes, I can’ in thirty countries
(Abendroth M., 2009).
37 At  the  turn  of  the  century,  Cuba  gained  a  remarkable  friend  that  fortified  both  its
economy  and  its  international  aspirations.  Even  before  Hugo  Chávez  was  elected
president  of  Venezuela,  he  and  Fidel  Castro  had  developed  a  personal  and  political
friendship.  In  2000,  Chávez  and  Castro  cemented  their  relationship  by  a  mutually
beneficial agreement: Cuban doctors and educational experts went to Venezuela. Cuba
accomplished a substantial provision of oil at preferential rates. After the creation of the
ALBA  (Alianza  Bolivariana  para  los  pueblos  de  Nuestra  América)  between  Cuba  and
Venezuela, Chávez became its financier. He also generously co-financed Cuba’s civilian
internationalism abroad. 
 
The Soft Power of peace provider
38 Over the course of several decades, the press and mass media has portrayed Cuba as the
archetypical  warmonger,  whose secret  service  was always  on the alert  to  proliferate
subversive, terrorist and guerrilla movements worldwide, and especially in Africa and
Latin America. Interestingly enough, the Departamento América began to get involved
with peace negotiations in the late 1980s and thereafter. Here I present the case of two
countries in which Cuba (and Norway) displayed an important role and gained prestige in
Latin America.
39 After the brutal years of counterinsurgency (1978-1983) under the military governments
of the General-Presidents Lucas García and Ríos Montt, the guerrilla lost the war (Balconi
J. and Kruijt D., 2004, and Kruijt D., 2008: 144-153; 2017: 186-189). They had retired to the
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remote  indigenous  regions,  retaining  some  smaller  urban  pockets  in  the  western
highlands and the northern jungle. The leadership of the URNG lived in exile in Mexico
City, from where the chief commanders directed the war by fax and telephone. Peace
talks were initiated in Oslo in 1990 and a national peace commission,  headed by the
archbishop,  was inaugurated.  The peace negotiations were presided over first  by the
archbishop and then by a special UN envoy. 
40 But  the  real  breakthrough  came  when  two  key  negotiators,  Rodrigo  Asturias
(Comandante-en-Jefe of the Organización del Pueblo en Armas,  ORPA, and one of the
URNG negotiators) and General Julio Balconi (appointed as minister of defense in 1996)
reached an agreement about informal consultations to avoid friction and confrontation at
the peace table. They developed a relationship of mutual trust and rapport. In early 1993
army delegates and the guerrilla leadership convened in extra-official sessions, with the
silent approval of  the civilian presidents.  Norway and Cuba played favorable roles as
facilitators. In March 1993, Cuba’s good offices were employed to organize a three-day
session of reconciliation between the army and the guerrilla29. Both Fidel and Raúl were
very accommodating and after the Havana session,  the URNG announced a unilateral
cease-fire while Balconi dissolved and disarmed the paramilitary patrols. The army staff
and the second-in-commands of the guerrilla worked out a timetable of disarmament.
Between March and December 1996, when the final peace agreements were signed, the
army ceased to attack the guerrilla encampments and disarmed the paramilitary forces.
The peace negotiations were successfully ended after the Havana sessions.
41 Cuba acted as a peace facilitator, at the request of both the Colombian government and
the  guerrilla  movements  FARC  and  ELN  (Segura  R.  &  Mechoulan  D.,  2017;  see
Herbolzheimer K., 2016). During a previous peace process (1989-1991), when M-19 and
other guerrilla groups signed a peace agreement and were incorporated into Colombian
society,  Cuba also acted as  a  peace facilitator,  at  the request  of  both the Colombian
government  and  the  guerrilla  movements.  During  the  next  two  decades,  the
Departamento América and Fidel Castro in person dedicated much time to the efforts of
the consecutive Colombian presidents and the changing leadership of the FARC and the
ELN to reach an agreement or to establish periods of temporary cease-fire30.
42 In the early 1990s, the FARC negotiated with representatives of President César Gaviria in
Venezuela and Mexico without even reaching the minimum terms for an agreement. In
1998 President Pastrana offered the FARC a demilitarized zone in El Caguán in order to
initiate new peace consultations. Previously, he had requested the good offices of Castro
through  a  representative  of  the  Departamento  América.  In  2001  the  FARC  and  the
government  exchanged  prisoners31.  But  the  peace  negotiations  stagnated.  In  2002,
President Pastrana suspended the dialogues and the war continued. When Uribe won the
presidential elections that year, the war intensified and both the FARC and the ELN lost
territorial  control  and  saw  their  number  of  combatants  reduce.  Uribe  initiated  a
programme of mass demobilization of  the paramilitary forces and established a legal
opportunity  for  individuals  to  leave  the  guerrilla  on  easy  terms.  The  majority  was
demobilized between 2003 and 2006. In April 2017, 58, 987 former combatants (of which
25% were reported to be deserted guerrilleros) were enlisted in a programme of social
reintegration32. When in 2010 President Santos was inaugurated, the FARC requested a
new round of negotiations and the new president acceded. Through the good offices of
Norway and Cuba, bilateral negotiations started in Havana in 2012. In November 2016, the
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FARC and the Colombian government signed the final peace agreement33.  In February
2017 peace negotiations began between the ELN and the Colombian government in Quito.
 
Conclusion: the normalization with the United States
43 Cuba was one of the twenty founding members of the OAS in 1948. In 1962 its membership
was  suspended by  a  majority  vote,  under  strong American pressure.  The  island was
excluded  because  “Marxism–Leninism  was  incompatible”  with  the  principles  and
objectives of the inter-American system34. Initially, the United States had also tried to
convince the OAS members applying economic sanctions as well, but that was refused by
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico. The United States’ two neighbor
countries, Canada and Mexico, never ruptured diplomatic relations with Cuba.
44 During the Reagan administration, Cuba was put on the US “State Sponsors of Terrorism”
list in 1982.There is no second country in the world that was the subject of American
sanctions during so many decades. The embargo also affected the large Cuban-American
diaspora  living  in  the  United  States  via  rigorous  travel  restrictions  and  the  limited
possibility to send dollar remittances to their family members. 
45 Cuban  diplomacy  was  always  interested  in  (re-)establishing  and  maintaining  good
relations with all member states of the United Nations. It participated and participates in
nearly all organizations of the UN- system. This even during its most extreme period of
austerity, it never reduced its system of international relations. But especially it nurtured
its relations with Latin America and with the Caribbean states. Its Soft Power prestige and
its reputation as an important international and regional assistance made the persistent
economic embargo a kind of Old Cold War relic.  Year after year the Assembly of the
United Nations voted against the continuance of the embargo, with a growing majority of
countries  condemning  the U.S.  embargo.  In  2016,  191  member  countries  backed  the
resolution.
46 Cuba also sought  to strengthen Caribbean and Latin American organizations without
participation of the United States. In 2004, in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela created the South
American Community of Nations in Cusco, renamed in 2007 the Union of South American
Nations  (UNASUR).  UNASUR is  in  many  aspects  a  kind  of  the  South  American  OAS.
Another alternative for the OAS without the United States was created in 2011 in Caracas
as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Cuba and Venezuela
were the leading countries of the ALBA group of countries created in 2004 and expanded
afterwards. Cuba’s suspension from the OAS appeared to many of its members an odd
relic from the Cold War. In 2007 the OAS countries invited Cuba to retake its seat, even
with the consent of the United States. But this time Cuba rebuffed the invitation, a stance
that officially was maintained until 2014. 
47 Until 2013 the most important countries of the region were governed by center-left or
leftist  governments.  With  the  support  of  friendly  governments  in  such  important
countries as Argentina (under the presidency of the Kirchners, 2003-2015), Brazil (under
the presidency of Lula and Dilma, 2003-2014) and Venezuela (under Chávez, 1999-2013)
Cuba  had  become  a  much  appreciated  country  in  the  entire  Latin  American  and
Caribbean region.  It  also  helped that  three  former  national  labor  union leaders  had
become  presidents  of  their  countries:  Lula  (Brazil),  Morales  (Bolivia)  and  Maduro
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(Venezuela).  Furthermore,  former  guerrilla  leaders  were  elected  president  or  vice-
president in Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Uruguay. 
48 The only country in the Western Hemisphere remaining hostile to Cuba was the United
States,  the  “Colossus  of  the  North”  in  Cuba’s  terminology.  Notwithstanding  mutual
hostility,  the United States and Cuba had a history of decades-long negotiation about
normalization. officially and via back channels35. In 1977 a minimum degree of formal
diplomatic interaction contact was established by the United States Interests Section (of
the  Embassy  of  Switzerland)  in  Havana,  and its  counterpart  Interests  Section of  the
Republic  of  Cuba in  Washington.  Visiting  government  officials  of  both  countries
continued to discuss and negotiate. In their very detailed analysis of the character of the
negotiations and the asymmetric power relations, LeoGrande and Kornbluh conclude that
in general “(…) the Cubans have been too eager to negotiate and too gullible in believing
U.S. promises” (LeoGrande W. and Kornbluh P., 2014: 407).
49 At the end of the first decade of this century, under the presidency of Raúl Castro, a
prudent  program  of  economic  and  political  reforms  had  initiated.  One  of  the  most
delicate problems was the relation with the Catholic episcopate, icy for 50 years. But the
relation slowly improved. A nasty incident triggered the beginning of a rapport36. The
protesters’ group Damas en Blanco (Women in White), spouses and female relatives of
dissident prisoners, used to demonstrate every Sunday morning around the churches in
Havana.  Cuba’s  ‘voluntary  shock  groups’  intimidated  demonstrators,  sometimes  in  a
heavy-handed manner. In 2010 such a group pursued the women into the Church. The
hitherto very guarded episcopate thought that ‘enough was enough’ and wrote a letter to
Eusebio Leal Spengler, historian of Havana and a close friend of Raúl, to request a high-
level  meeting.  As  a  consequence,  the  Cuban  President  and  Cardinal  Jaime  Ortega  y
Alamino initiated a “dialogue on issues of mutual interest between the Cuban state and
the Catholic Church in Cuba.” Afterwards, the cardinal made several trips to Washington.
This budding relationship also permitted a much better understanding between Cuba and
the Vatican. In 2013, when the Argentinean Cardinal Jorge Bergoglio – in whose ideas one
can trace some affinity with Liberation Theology – became Pope Francis,  the Vatican
functioned  as  a  broker  between  Cuba  and  the  United  States37.  It  paved  the  way  to
restoring diplomatic ties and the normalization of relations between the two countries.
50 In 2008 then presidential candidate Obama had already had hinted at ‘direct diplomacy’
with Cuba. In the first months of his first term he relieved restrictions on travel and
remittances. At the beginning of Obama’s second term relations improved. A large part of
the  rapprochement  between  the  two  countries  was  negotiated  in  secret.  Still,  the
announcement  in Havana and Washington that  both governments  would restore full
diplomatic ties came as a surprise to most observers of the US-Cuban relationship. The
Cold War for Cuba ended in December 2014. However, in 2017, incoming US president
Trump re-frosted much of the warmer relations that his antecessor initiated.
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NOTES
1. In this article I heavily draw on research published as Kruijt, 2017. 
2. For a more detailed overview of the US-Cuban relations and the consequences of the embargo,
see Bernell, 2011, Dávalos Fernández, 2012, and Spadoni, 2010.
3. Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay broke their diplomatic relations in 1964 after explicit American
admonition. Canada (until 1990 only an observer of the OAS) never interrupted its diplomatic
relations with Cuba.
4. For detailed analyses of Cuba’s influence and the existing guerrilla movements in this period,
see Gott,  1971, Lamberg, 1979, Wickham-Crowley, 1992, Oikión Solano, Rey Tristán and López
Ávalos, 2014 and Martín Álvarez and Rey Tristan, 2017.
5. Formally, the Departamento America was created in 1975, but all its institutional predecessors
were  staffed  by  the  same  persons  under  command  of  Manuel  Piñeiro  (until  1992).  The
institutions evolved from G2 (1959) in M in Vice Ministerio Técnico (VMT) in Dirección General
de  Inteligencia  (DGI)  in  Dirección  General  de  Liberación  Nacional  (DGLN)  and  finally  in
Departamento América.
6. It was the only Cuban operation in Latin America where the majority of the guerrilleros was
Cuban, not local nationals. The Cuban members of his guerrilla column were experienced veteran
combatants. For a detailed analysis of the failed campaign, see James, 2001 [1960], based on data
provided by the CIA. See also Prado Salmón, 1987; general (then captain) Gary Prado Salmón was
the leader of the army unit that captured Che Guevara.
7. Data mentioned by Sergio Guerra Vilaboy, Head of the Department of History at the University
of Havana, during a seminar at the Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, 24 April 2014.
8. Data of Guerra Vilaboy and Maldonado Gallardo, 2005, p. 129, and Domínguez Guadarrama,
2013, p. 136-138.
9. Interview with Osvaldo Cárdenas (Havana, 18 October 2012); at that time Cárdenas was the
Caribbean Section Chief.
10. Interview with Luis Morejón (Havana, 1 March 2012); Morejón was the deputy Director of the
ICAP.
11. Interview with Fernando Martínez Heredia (Havana, 2 March 2012).
12. Interview with Luis Morejón (Havana, 1 March 2012).
13. Interview  with  Julio  López  Campos  (Managua,  2  June  2011).  López  was  the  head  of  the
Sandinista Department of International Relations until 1990.
14. And  for  a  shorter  period  the  progressive  Bolivian  Generals  Obando  and  Torres  and  the
General Rodríguez Lara in Ecuador.
15. Otto  Marrero,  during  44  years  the  Head  of  the  Caribbean  Section  of  the  Department  of
International Relations of the Central Committee (conversation 5 December 2012 in Havana).
16. In  1983,  Granada  and  Surinam  had  suspended  or  broken  off  their  relations  with  Cuba;
Granada re-established its relations in 1992 and Surinam in 1995.
17. Interview with Fernando Ravelo Renedo (Havana, 17 October 2011); Ravelo was the newly
appointed ambassador.
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18. Interview with Luis Rojas Nuñez (Havana, 20 January 2012); Rojas was the representative of
the FPMR.
19. Interview  with  Arnol  Kremer  (Luis  Mattini),  the  last  comandante  of  the  ERP  before  its
dissolution (Buenos Aires, 22 and 25 April 2017). 
20. When a Guatemalan army delegation visited the island in 1996, during the reconciliation
sessions with theguerrilla, the pilots were shown all MIGS but they were not ignited; that was
only  permitted  in  case  of  an  emergency  (conversations  with  General  Julio  Balconi  in  Cuba,
October 2003, when we wrote the final draft of his memoirs [Balconi and Kruijt, 2004] in Havana).
21. Interview  with  Jorge  Luis  Joa,  27  October  2011;  at  that  time  Joa  was  the  official  of  the
Departamento América in charge of Colombia.
22. Interview with Carlos Antelo (24 and 27 October 2011); at that time Antelo was the official of
the Departamento América stationed at the Cuban embassy.
23. In this section I draw on chapter 6 of Kruijt, 2017.
24. and Kirk and Erisman, 2009; with regard to Cuba’s medical assistance. About Cuba’s civilian
assistance, see also Kumaraswami, 2012)
25. Colaboración Médica Cubana – EcuRed,EcuRed,http://www.ecured.cu/Colaboraci%C3%B3n_M%
C3%A9dica_Cubana (page consulted 3 July 2017).
26. Interview  with  Maritza  González  Bravo,  academic  vice-rector  of  the  ELAM  system  (9
November 2012). 
27. Kirk and Erisman, 2009, p.134 ff.,  provide the specifics about Cuba’s medical assistance in
Latin America and the Caribbean. For a testimonial account of the medical missions in Africa, see
López Blanch, 2005.
28. Interview with Javier Labrada, 8 November 2012); Labrada was a senior adviser in Venezuela,
Bolivia and Haiti.
29. Interview  with  Ramiro  Abreu  (25  October  2011);  Abreu  was  the  overviewer  of  the
Departamento América for Central America.
30. Castro even allowed a book publication, Castro Ruz 2009, about the repeated requests
of Cuba’s good offices to be published, with excerpts of diplomatic reports, accounts by
officers  of  the  Departamento  América,  and  taped  conversations  between  Castro  and
guerrilla leaders in Havana and elsewhere.
31. In 2007 another exchange of prisoners took place under the auspices of President Chávez of
Venezuela.
32. Data published by the Agencia Colombiana de Reinserción (ACR, table 1).
33. Segura and Mechoulan, 2017, p. 1, 4, 9-11, 13, 36, repeatedly mention the decisive role of
Cuba.
34. Quoted in Birsen, 2015.
35. A very fine and detailed analysis of the intents to normalize US-Cuban relations is LeoGrande
and Kornbluh, 2014, and Ramírez Cañedo and Morales Domínguez, 2014. 
36. Interview with Mgrs. Emilio Aranguren Echeverría, bishop of Holguin, then in charge of the
episcopal Human Rights Commission (Holguín, 4 August 2010).
37. On 12 February 2016, Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill, the heads of the Roman Catholic and
the Russian Orthodox churches, met in Havana and issued a common statement; this time Raúl
Castro was the go-between.
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ABSTRACTS
After its Revolution Cuba was forced into a Latin American and Caribbean diplomatic quarantine
by the United States. In the 1960s, Cuba’s relations with the region were basically characterized
by its support to insurgency and guerrilla movements. In the 1970s, Cuba overcame its isolation
by normalizing relations in Latin America and with the newly independent Caribbean island-
states. Support to the Armed Left was only given in the case of civil war against dictatorships;
Cuba also assisted in building national umbrella organizations of insurgent movements. After
1985-1989  it  used  its  Soft  Power  (medical  brigades  and  facilities,  literacy  and  post-disaster
reconstruction  teams),  and  its  goods  offices  during  peace  negotiations  to  become  a  much-
respected country in the region. During the government of Raúl Castro economic and political
reforms  were  initiated  while  a  rapport  with  the  Catholic  episcopate  was  established.  It
contributed in facilitating with success  the decades-long negotiations with the United States
about  normalizing  relations.  A  substantial  part  of  this  article  is  based  on  new  and  recent
interviews with numerous Cuban key actors.
Peu après  le  début  de  la  Révolution,  les  États-Unis  forcent  l'Amérique latine et  la  Caraïbe  à
soumettre Cuba à une quarantaine diplomatique. Dans les années 1960, l’appui des insurrections
et des mouvements de guérilla caractérisent les relations de Cuba avec la région. Dans les années
1970, Cuba dépasse son isolement en normalisant ses relations avec l'Amérique latine, et les États
de la Caraïbe qui viennent juste d’accéder à l’indépendance. Le soutient à la gauche armée ne fut
accordé  qu’en  cas  de  guerre  civile  contre  des  dictatures  militaires.  Cuba  œuvre  aussi  pour
l’unification des mouvements insurrectionnels. Après 1985-1989, Cuba emploie son soft-power
(brigades  et  attention  médicale,  brigades d’alphabétisation  et  de  bons  offices  pendant  les
négociations de paix) pour devenir un pays très respecté dans la région. Avec le gouvernement
de Raúl Castro débutent des réformes économiques et politiques, et une relation de réconciliation
avec l’épiscopat  catholique.  Cela  facilite  le  succès  des  négociations ouvertes  depuis  plusieurs
décennies en faveur de la normalisation avec les États-Unis. Une grande partie de cet article est
basée sur des entretiens récents menés auprès de responsables cubains.
Después  de  su  Revolución,  Cuba  fue  sometida  a  una  cuarentena diplomática  por  los  Estados
Unidos con respecto a América Latina y el Caribe. En la década de 1960, las relaciones de Cuba con
la  región  se  caracterizaron  básicamente  por  su  apoyo  a  la  insurgencia  y  los  movimientos
guerrilleros. En la década de 1970, Cuba superó su aislamiento por la normalización de relaciones
con  América  Latina  y  los  estados  Caribeños  recientemente  independizados.  El  apoyo  a  la
izquierda armada fue otorgado solamente en caso de guerras civiles contra dictaduras militares.
Cuba también ayudó en la construcción de organizaciones unitarias de movimientos insurgentes.
Después  de  1985-1989  utilizó  su  poder  suave  (brigadas  y  facilidades  médicas  y  brigadas  de
alfabetización y buenos oficios durante las negociaciones de paz) para convertirse en un país
altamente  respetado  en  la  región.  Durante  el  gobierno de Raúl  Castro  se  iniciaron reformas
económicas  y  políticas,  al  mismo  tiempo  una  relación  de  entendimiento  con  el  episcopado
católico fue establecido. Eso contribuyó a facilitar el éxito de las negociaciones de varias décadas
con Estados Unidos sobre normalización de relaciones. Una parte de este artículo fue obtenido en
base de entrevistas numerosas con actores claves cubanos.
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